What do political parties have to say about corporate democracy?

Party platforms on corporate democracy and governance (2023)

Few political parties have detailed policies on corporate democracy and governance, despite the major role that corporations play in our economy and political debate.

The extent of corporate political spending in Australia

The hidden political expenditure of Australian corporations (2023)

Publicly-listed companies in Australia disclose little information about their political expenditure, with few disclosing lobbying spending or payments to trade associations.

Most do not outline clear policies to address political donations, political expenditure or the revolving door between politics and business. Neither the law nor stock exchange rules require them to do so, and few do it willingly.

Political activity of particular industries

Point blank: Political strategies of Australia’s gun lobby (2019)

The Shooting Industry Foundation of Australia (SIFA), the peak body for Australia’s five largest firearms suppliers, spends roughly the same amount of money, again as a share of population, on political campaigning as the National Rifle Association (the NRA) does in the United States.

The Australian gun lobby runs political campaigns and lobbies politicians and journalists, but it attracts little attention in Australia because it keeps its operations low key. Gun lobby political advertising in recent years has mostly avoided mentioning firearms or gun control at all.

Undermining our democracy: Foreign corporate influence through the Australian mining lobby (2017)

Australia’s mining industry is 86% foreign owned and has spent over $541 million in the last ten years on lobbying Australian governments through its peak lobby groups, which are dominated by foreign interests. Spending on lobbying by individual mining companies is not public information, but would bring this number up significantly.

The tip of the iceberg: Political donations from the mining industry (2017)

• The mining industry has disclosed donations of $16.6 million to major political parties over the last ten years (2006-07 to 2015-16)
• Disclosed mining industry donations to political parties have increased from a base of $345,000 in 2006-07 to a peak of $3,788,904 in 2010-11
• 81% of these donations went to the Coalition, including 71% to the Liberal Party

Greasing the wheels (2016)

The report examines 6 highly controversial QLD resource projects and highlights the strong connection of these companies to QLD and federal political parties. The Queensland Liberal National Party accepted over $300,000 from companies associated with these projects, but most of the political donations went to the Liberal Party of Australia, who accepted $1.75 million.

Too close for comfort (2015)

The report examines the relationship between the Queensland Government and the fossil fuel industry. The report reveals a pattern of secrecy, a lack of accountability and transparency and a fast moving revolving door between the highest level of the bureaucracy and government, where political donations may well be just the tip of the iceberg.

Executive remuneration

Reining it in: Executive pay in Australia (2010)

Various policy options are available to rein in executive pay, including: removing the tax concession on capital gains; increasing the top marginal rate of income tax; and, establishing an acceptable level of remuneration for executives and excluding amounts above this from qualifying as a legitimate company expense and therefore tax deductible.

Executive pay in Australia (2018)

The report analyses CEO pay in Australia, finding concerning trends that mirror the surge in executive pay in the lead-up to the GFC.

The political strategies and power of Australian corporations and lobbies

Securing diversity and transparency in political finance (2023)

The conventional tools for addressing political finance concerns are public funding, donation caps and spending caps. These tools are blunt instruments that have so far failed to rein in vested interests or address cash-for-access, and they risk many perverse outcomes – most notably, introducing unfair barriers to new entrants, independents and minor parties.

As the Australian Parliament seriously considers changes to electoral laws, including those governing political finance, this paper recommends an alternative suite of political finance reforms that would go a long way to making the political playing field more level and addressing cash-for-access at its roots: exposing it when it happens, making governments pay a political cost for facilitating it and banning it outright where doing so is proportionate, constitutional and likely to be effective.

Corporate power in Australia (2013)

The murky relationships between corporate interests and public policy remain poorly understood. Such indifference to this process, a process that can shift billions of dollars from one group in society to another can be explained in a number of ways including:

1. The volume of legislation that passes through our parliaments makes it difficult for anyone without large financial interests to monitor and evaluate all legislation with the potential to impact on an individual or organisation’s interests.
2. The complexity of the legislation, particularly the way that pieces of legislation may interact with existing legislation or new legislation or regulations that are pending but not yet public makes it even more difficult for ‘unvested interests’ to understand the significance of particular policy change.
3. While community groups and NGOs typically herald the passage of legislation they consider favourable, business groups are typically more constrained when legislation that is favourable to their interests is passed.

These three explanations are buttressed by the economics of ‘externalities’. Externalities help explain why governments are susceptible to lobbying and the influence of large corporations. Small changes in policy can deliver huge windfalls to a small group while imposing small costs on a large group.

Inquiry into the BCA Commitment to the Senate (2018)

The present submission questions the Business Council of Australia’s (BCA) Commitment to increasing investment, employment and wages in the event that the outstanding tax cuts are legislated. We looked specifically at the 10 corporate CEOs who made the commitment on behalf of their companies and found some half of those paid no tax. One wonders what their commitment could possibly mean.

We then examine the logic of the tax cuts, issues to do with dividend imputation, problems with the theory, and problems in the modelling exercises as well as the evidence from cross-country data and the evidence from Australia’s own history. Much of this has been covered in earlier Australia Institute papers but there is a new treatment of the modelling problems. However, we were able to add a new section that examines the early indicators following the Trump tax cuts.

Polling – Tasmanian Election Issues (2024)

57% of Tasmanians support banning political donations from the gambling, salmon farming and property development industries.

Corporate malfeasance

Corporate malfeasance in Australia (2016)

The report analyses findings from across several corporate regulatory bodies and related agencies and finds widespread wrong-doing in the Australian private sector.